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Abstract	
This	 article	 explores	 competing	 interpretive	 frames	 regarding	 shale	 gas	 in	 Bulgaria,	 Poland,	 and	
Romania.	 These	 countries	 face	 the	 choice	 of	 embracing	 shale	 gas	 as	 a	 potential	 revolutionizing	
domestic	source	of	energy,	against	the	backdrop	of	Russia	serving	as	the	dominant	gas	supplier.	This	
makes	them	interesting	cases	for	studying	how	policy	narratives	and	discourses	coalesce	around	a	
novel	 technology.	 The	 findings,	which	 are	based	on	 sixty‐six	 semistructured	 research	 interviews,	
point	 to	 differing	 and	 indeed	 competing	 frames,	 ranging	 from	 national	 security,	 environmental	
boons,	 to	 economic	 sellout	 and	 authoritarianism,	with	different	 sets	 of	 institutions	 sharing	 those	
frames.	This	suggests	that	enhancing	energy	security	by	way	of	deploying	novel	energy	technologies	
such	 as	 shale	 gas	 fracking	 is	 not	 simply	 a	 function	 of	 resource	 endowments	 and	 technological	
progress.	Instead,	it	is	the	result	of	complex	dynamics	unfolding	among	social	stakeholders	and	the	
related	discursive	processes,	which	eventually	will	determine	whether—or	not—shale	gas	will	go	
global.	
	
	
	
Shale	 gas	 has	 changed	 the	 energy	 industry.	 The	 primary	 technical	 driver	 behind	 the	 “shale	 gas	
revolution”	is	a	leap	in	technical	innovation:	hydraulic	fracturing,	or	“fracking”	for	short,	coupled	with	
horizontal	drilling	(Sovacool	2014a).	These	advances	in	technology	allow	exploiting	reserves	trapped	
in	 deep‐rock	 formations.	 Today,	 shale	 gas—both	 the	 largest	 source	 of	 and	 a	 popular	 term	 for	
unconventional	hydrocarbons—represents	some	45	percent	of	total	US	gas	output	(EIA	2014).			
	
Clearly,	 fracking	 technology	 is	 contested.	 It	 offers	 material	 benefits	 to	 the	 countries	 using	 the	
technology,	in	the	shape	of	economic	welfare,	tax	dollar	income,	or	security	gains	in	an	energy	world	
that	 has	 turned	 more	 volatile.	 However,	 environmental	 harm	 may	 be	 caused	 by	 the	 chemicals	
entailed	in	fracking	fluids,	methane	migrating	to	the	surface,	and	the	processing,	storage,	or	transport	
of	contaminated	flowback	water	(Gordalla	et	al.	2013;	Howarth	et	al.	2011;	Myers	2012;	Vengosh	et	
al.	2014).	For	societies	deciding	whether	to	invest	in	the	technology,	fracking	in	essence	amounts	to	
a	cost‐benefit	calculation	(Jackson	et	al.	2014).	
		
Besides	the	purely	empirical	dimension,	a	number	of	contextual	factors	matter.	Complex	dynamics	
between	 societal	 groups,	 the	 characteristics	 of	 incumbent	 socio‐technical	 systems,	 and	 the	
consequent	 societal	 response	 all	 exert	 profound	 and	 complex	 influences	 over	 technological	
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innovation,	diffusion,	and	acceptance	(Bijker	and	Law	1992;	Coutard	1999;	Hughes	1983;	Hughes	
1986;	Misa	2003;	Summerton	1994).	In	short,	context	and	framing	give	empirics	their	meaning.		
	
Fracking	has	become	subject	 to	scholarly	 investigation	 from	a	range	of	disciplines.	Most	research	
from	the	energy	studies	field	has	continued	to	emphasize	technical	and	economic	concerns,	ignoring	
more	 surreptitious	 yet	 salient	 social,	 political,	 and	 cultural	 elements	 (Sovacool	 2014b;	 Sovacool	
2014c).	A	rapidly	growing	literature	beyond	the	energy	studies	community	is	particularly	looking	at	
the	public	 attitudes,	 social	 contestation,	 and	public	discourse	 surrounding	 fracking	 (Boudet	 et	 al.	
2014;	Brasier	et	al.	2011;	Brown	et	al.	2013;	Cotton	et	al.	2014;	Evensen	et	al.	2014;	Hudgins	and	
Poole	 2014).	 However,	 these	 works	 so	 far	 remain	 centered	 on	 the	 US	 and	 Western	 Europe	
(particularly	the	UK).			
	
Based	on	extensive	field	research	and	a	total	of	sixty‐six	semistructured	interviews,	in	this	study	we	
explore	the	“interpretive	flexibility”	of	fracking	in	Bulgaria,	Poland,	and	Romania.	These	countries,	
like	Central	Eastern	Europe	more	generally,	 face	 the	choice	of	embracing	shale	gas	as	a	potential	
revolutionizing	domestic	source	of	energy	(Goldthau	2013).	This	makes	them	interesting	cases	for	
studying	 how	 policy	 narratives	 and	 discourses	 coalesce	 around	 a	 novel	 technology,	 and	 the	
interpretative	frames	assigned	to	that	technology	in	these	countries.	
	
In	this	way,	 the	article	contributes	to	three	distinct	strands	of	 the	 literature.	First,	 it	speaks	to	an	
ongoing	academic	debate	on	the	politics	and	social	construction	of	technology	(Bijker	1992;	Hughes	
1987;	Pinch	and	Bijker	1984).	Second,	it	adds	to	the	work	done	on	socially	contested	technologies,	
such	as	nanotechnology,	biotech,	or	even	geoengineering	(Corner	et	al.	2013;	Falkner	and	Jaspers	
2012;	Levidow	1998).	Third,	it	feeds	into	analyses	on	the	power	of	frames	and	narratives	in	the	public	
discourse	 and	 in	 policy‐making	 (Bomberg	 2015;	 Feindt	 and	 Oels	 2005;	 Lachapelle	 et	al.	 2014;	
Lorenzoni	et	al.	2007).	Each	of	 these	 three	themes—construction,	contestation,	and	 framing—has	
relevance	to	political	scientists	and	scholars.		
	
The	next	section	delves	into	case	selection,	the	theoretical	concept,	and	the	empirical	strategy.	The	
following	 sections	 discuss	 individual	 case	 studies,	 offer	 some	 comparative	 analysis,	 and	 present	
findings	and	conclusions	for	analysts	and	practitioners.		
	
Case	Selection,	Theoretical	Concept,	and	Empirical	Strategy	
	
Central	Eastern	Europe	is	highly	energy‐import‐dependent,	with	some	countries	sourcing	up	to	100	
percent	of	their	consumed	natural	gas	from	Russia’s	Gazprom.	Poland	imports	around	60	percent	of	
its	 consumed	 gas,	 and	 Bulgaria	 96	 percent.	 Romania	 constitutes	 an	 outlier,	 with	 a	 15	 percent	
dependence	 rate	 (Eurogas	 2014).	 However,	 Romania’s	 conventional	 production	 is	 set	 to	 decline	
significantly	by	2020	(KPMG	2012),	which	will	 likely	 increase	 the	country’s	currently	 low	 import	
ratio.	 Moreover,	 coal	 plays	 an	 important	 role	 in	 domestic	 electricity	 production	 in	 all	 of	 these	
countries.	Therefore,	EU	decarbonization	policies	will	 force	them	to	replace	coal	by	 less	polluting	
sources,	with	gas	resuming	the	role	of	a	“bridge	fuel.”		
	
Importantly,	 all	 of	 these	 countries	 share	a	 common	history	as	planned	economies,	which	 implies	
similar	 regulatory	 legacies	 and	 a	 strong	 state	 bias.	 In	 addition,	 they	 are	 subject	 to	 identical	 EU	
environmental	regulations.	At	the	same	time,	it	is	left	to	nation	states	to	choose	the	energy	mix	and	
the	sources	of	 supply,	and	 the	EU	has	not	enacted	any	regulation	on	 fracking.	Finally,	 the	energy	
sector	plays	an	important	role	in	all	three	countries.	This	is	due	not	only	to	the	sector’s	size	in	total	
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GDP—some	20	percent	in	the	case	of	Poland,	for	instance	(EMIS	2014)—but	also	to	its	function	as	an	
engine	of	economic	growth.	
	
Against	this	backdrop,	the	prospect	of	domestic	gas	reserves	has	gained	traction	in	Eastern	European	
policy	debates	(Goldthau	2012).	According	to	estimates,	Poland’s	148	trillion	cubic	feet	(Tcf)	or	4.191	
billion	cubic	meters	(bcm)	of	technically	recoverable	shale	gas	reserves	could	meet	roughly	250	years	
of	current	consumption.	Bulgaria	and	Romania	together	hold	37	Tcf	(1.047	bcm),	or	around	70	years	
of	 cumulative	 consumption	 (EIA/ARI	2013).	The	 exploitation	of	 fracking	would	 therefore	benefit	
countries	 that	 all	 come	 with	 similar	 high	 import	 dependences	 on	 Russia	 and	 that	 face	
decarbonization	imperatives	stemming	from	EU	climate	policies.	In	fact,	the	governments	of	all	three	
countries	have	publicly	supported	shale	gas	exploration,	regardless	of	their	party	orientation.	This	
makes	 shale	 gas	 in	Central	Eastern	Europe	 an	 ideal	 case	 for	 studying	 the	 interpretative	meaning	
assigned	to	a	novel	(energy)	technology—fracking.		
	
A	key	insight	(Bijker	1997;	Hughes	1987;	Klein	and	Kleinman	2002;	Pinch	and	Bijker	1984)	is		that	
the	evolutionary	pathway	of	a	novel	technology	is	not	only	a	function	of	its	technical	qualities	and	
characteristics,	but	equally	of	its	perception	within	society.	In	this	context,	interpretative	frames	are	
of	 great	 importance,	 as	 they	 assign	 meanings	 to	 managers	 and	 corporate	 actors,	 as	 well	 as	 to	
regulators,	investors,	and	even	end‐users	(Sovacool	and	Brown	2015).	
	
Frames	are	nothing	new	in	the	field	of	global	environmental	politics	(Hayes	and	Knox‐Hayes	2014;	
Wahlström	et	al.	2013).	The	specific	concept	of	interpretive	frames	used	in	this	article	comes	formally	
from	a	stream	of	thought	known	as	the	“social	construction	of	technology,”	or	SCOT.	SCOT	holds	that	
technology	emerges	 in	society	as	a	“seamless	web”	(Hughes	1986),	or	what	Latour	(1999)	calls	a	
“sociotechnical	imbroglio.”	SCOT	emphasizes	the	mutually	constitutive	natures	of	technology,	which	
is	 usually	 described	 as	 a	 technical	 “artifact,”	 and	 society	 (Bijker	 1993;	 Misa	 1988).	 Within	 this	
framework,	 four	 important	elements	have	been	developed:	the	relevant	social	group,	 interpretive	
flexibility,	closure	and	stabilization,	and	the	technological	frame.	
	
The	 relevant	 social	 group	 denotes	 the	 institutions	 and	 organizations	 that	 share	 the	 same	 set	 of	
meanings	 attached	 to	 a	 particular	 technology	 (Bijker	 1992;	 Bijker	 1995;	 Bijker	 1997;	 Pinch	 and	
Bijker	 1984).	 The	 social	 groups	 that	 constitute	 parts	 of	 the	 “environment”	 for	 technology	 play	 a	
critical	role	in	shaping	and	defining	the	problems	that	arise	during	the	development	of	an	artifact;	
social	 groups	 thus	 give	meaning	 to	 a	 technology	 and	define	 the	 problems	 facing	 that	 technology	
(Pinch	1996).		
	
Interpretive	flexibility	suggests	that	differing	interpretations	of	technological	artifacts	are	available.	
That	is,	different	social	groups	see	particular	technologies	in	different	ways.	These	technologies,	then,	
become	 “heterogeneous,”	 because	 their	 meaning,	 rather	 than	 being	 fixed,	 is	 interpreted	 and	
negotiated	by	those	social	groups	connected	to	it	(Pinch	and	Bijker	1984;	Sovacool	2011).		
	
Closure	and	stabilization	occur	for	a	technology	when	a	consensus	emerges	that	the	problems	arising	
in	design	and	development	have	been	alleviated.	Closure	has	come	to	mean	“the	process	by	which	
facts	or	artifacts	in	a	provisional	state	characterized	by	controversy	are	molded	into	a	stable	state	
characterized	by	consensus”	(Misa	1992,	110).	The	concepts	of	closure	and	stabilization	highlight	
that	different	interpretations	of	technology	can	lead	to	conflict	and	controversy,	and	that	refinement	
of	that	technology	will	inevitably	continue	until	such	differences	are	resolved.	
	
These	 three	 concepts	 culminate	 in	 the	 one	 we	 employ	 in	 this	 study,	 that	 of	 a	 technological	 or	
interpretive	frame.	An	interpretive	frame	attempts	to	capture	the	interactions	that	occur	between,	
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rather	than	in	or	above,	the	actors.	It	comprises	“all	elements	that	influence	the	interactions	within	
relevant	 social	 groups	and	 lead	 to	 the	attribution	of	meanings	 to	 technical	artifacts—and	 thus	 to	
constituting	 technology”	 (Bijker	 1997,	 123;	 Law	 1991).	 In	 a	 nutshell,	 a	 shared	 frame	 “defines	 a	
relevant	social	group	and	constitutes	[its]	members’	common	interpretation	of	an	artifact”	(Klein	and	
Kleinman	2002,	31).		
	
Frames	can	exist	in	three	configurations.	In	some	instances,	no	frame	may	be	present.	Here,	success	
in	adopting	a	novel	technology	depends	on	the	formation	of	a	constituency.	In	others,	one	frame	may	
be	present	because	a	dominant	group	is	able	to	insist	upon	its	adoption.	A	third	configuration	relates	
to	when	multiple	frames	are	contested,	and	criteria	external	to	such	frames	are	needed	to	resolve	the	
differences.	Shale	gas	exhibits	the	third	type,	since	it	is	a	relatively	mature	technology	(with	more	
than	 20	 years	 of	 operating	 experience),	 and	 yet	 faces	 contestation	 from	 (mostly	 environmental)	
opponents.	
	
To	identify	specific	frames	connected	to	shale	gas	in	Eastern	Europe,	we	relied	primarily	on	original	
data	drawn	from	sixty‐six	semistructured	interviews	in	Bulgaria,	Poland,	and	Romania,	conducted	
between	2012	and	2014.	Most	of	 these	 interviews	were	conducted	 in	Poland	(twenty‐seven)	and	
Bulgaria	(thirty),	and	the	remaining	nine	occurred	in	Romania	(see	Table	A2	in	the	Appendix).	The	
cases	 of	 Poland	 and	 Bulgaria—countries	 representing	 opposite	 ends	 of	 the	 shale	 gas	 policy	
spectrum—serve	to	identify	diverging	national‐level	frames	for	shale	gas.	The	case	of	Romania,	by	
contrast,	 explores	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 dominant	 frames	 in	 Poland	 and	 Bulgaria	 feature	 in	 a	
country	representing	the	middle	ground,	points	to	similarities,	and	maps	deviations.	This	justifies	a	
lower	number	of	data	points	for	Romania,	and	at	the	same	time	allows	for	triangulating	the	narrative	
patterns.	
	
The	 interviews	 covered	 all	 relevant	 policy	 levels	 (national,	 regional,	 and	 local)	 and	 actor	 groups	
(government,	public	and	private	companies,	regulators,	and	civil	society).	Prior	 to	conducting	sur	
place	interviews,	the	broader	patterns	characterizing	each	country’s	shale	gas	debate	were	identified	
through	an	assessment	of	media	coverage	and	desktop	research.	Our	interview	questions	were	then	
specifically	designed	to	explore	in	more	detail	the	dominant	perceptions	about	shale	gas	and	fracking,	
to	consolidate	them	in	the	shape	of	specific	frames,	and	to	unveil	the	importance	assigned	to	each	
frame.	 The	 interview	 proceedings	 were	 kept	 open	 to	 ensure	 that	 additional	 comments	 were	
adequately	captured	through	introspective	dialogue.	
	
Our	dataset	comes	with	three	caveats.	First,	due	to	the	sensitivity	of	the	subject,	a	number	of	actor	
groups	could	not	be	 included	 in	 the	sample—for	 instance,	 state‐owned	companies	 in	Bulgaria.	 In	
addition,	several	interviews	had	to	be	held	anonymously.	Throughout	the	article,	names	are	therefore	
omitted,	and	interviewees	are	identified	by	their	function	and	institutional	background.	Second,	the	
sample	is	not	fully	representative	regarding	the	spectrum	of	relevant	societal	groups	and	institutions.	
This	 caveat	 pertains	 primarily	 to	 civil	 society,	 which	 remains	 slightly	 underrepresented.	 To	 the	
extent	possible,	this	problem	was	addressed	through	triangulation	with	other	data	sources.	Third,	
since	 debates	 on	 fracking	 are	 still	 ongoing,	 the	 interpretative	 frames	 remain	 in	 flux.	 The	 data,	
therefore,	capture	the	meaning	given	to	fracking	as	a	novel	technology	for	the	period	between	2012	
and	2014.	The	outlier	here	is	Bulgaria,	a	country	where	“closure”	could	be	observed	via	a	2012	ban	
of	shale	gas,	backed	by	a	broad	set	of	societal	groups.	
	
We	proceed	to	identify	the	dominant	frames	within	each	country.	This	was	done	in	an	inductive	way,	
by	 coding	 and	 then	 grouping	 key	 terms	 used	 by	 the	 interviewees	 to	 describe	 their	 attitudes	 or	
expectations	 toward	 framing.	Then	we	compare	variations	 in	 frames	across	countries,	and	assess	
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their	 relative	 dominances.	 The	 aim	 is	 to	 uncover	 whether	 the	 dominant	 frames	 are	 similar	 or	
divergent	across	countries,	and	which	sets	of	actors	and	institutions	endorse	these	frames.		
	
Poland:	“Economic	Opportunity,”	“National	Security,”	and	
“Environmental	Boon”	
	
Poland	for	a	long	time	has	been	viewed	as	the	shale	gas	frontrunner	in	Central	Eastern	Europe.	The	
country	has	been	the	target	of	major	international	energy	companies,	including	ExxonMobil,	Shell,	
ENI,	 and	 Chevron,	 as	 well	 as	 companies	 specializing	 in	 shale	 gas,	 such	 as	 Talisman,	 Marathon,	
Cuadrilla,	and	Lane	Energy.	The	prospects	of	unconventional	gas	have	become	bleaker,	though,	after	
most	of	the	larger	companies	turned	their	backs	on	Poland	due	to	disappointing	test	drillings.2	
	
The	data	on	Poland	reveal	three	dominant	interpretative	frames	for	shale	gas.	The	first,	the	economic	
opportunity	frame,	embraces	shale	gas	as	a	source	of	welfare.	The	positive	effects	on	job	creation,	
state	 revenues	on	national	 and	 subnational	 levels,	 and	 the	 competitiveness	of	 the	manufacturing	
industry	 constitute	 the	 core	of	 this	 frame.	This	narrative	 essentially	mirrors	 statements	made	by	
Radoslav	 Sikorski,	 Poland’s	 former	 foreign	minister,	 to	 the	 effect	 that	 shale	 gas	 could	make	 the	
country	“a	second	Norway.”3	The	frame	was	found	to	be	most	dominant	among	business,	the	oil‐and‐
gas	 sector,	 and	 the	 state	 administration,	 but	 it	was	 also	 supported	by	 a	 broader	 cross‐section	 of	
societal	actors.	
	
In	 the	words	 of	 a	 director‐level	 representative	 of	 the	 Polish	 Confederation	 of	 Private	 Employers	
(PKPP	Lewiatan),	 shale	 gas	 “can	be	 an	 important	 driver	 for	 the	Polish	 economy	 [because	 it]	 can	
produce	cheaper	gas	for	other	economic	sectors	[such	as]	the	chemical	industry.”	In	the	same	vein,	a	
former	advisor	to	the	Polish	foreign	minister	stressed	lower	energy	costs	and	a	“knock‐on	effect	on	
energy	consuming	industry.”	Adding	to	this	statement,	a	member	of	the	Economic	Policy	Department	
of	the	Polish	Foreign	Ministry	pointed	specifically	to	the	economic	benefits	for	local	communities,	for	
whom	“shale	gas	[is]	a	tremendous	opportunity	to	speed	up	their	development.”	Furthermore,	an	
interviewee	 representing	 the	 Office	 of	 the	Minister	 of	 the	 Treasury—the	 body	 overseeing	 state‐
owned	companies—stressed	that	“[w]e	will	do	our	best	to	help	investors,	because	our	companies	
will	 benefit	 as	well.”	 An	 advisor	 to	 the	minister	 of	 the	 environment,	 in	 charge	 of	 environmental	
oversight,	seconded	this	statement	by	revealing	that		“we	will	try	to	regulate	[shale]	in	a	way	that	will	
boost	the	level	of	investments	and	security	of	investments.”	
	
For	 representatives	 of	 the	 extractive	 industry,	 “[s]hale	 gas	 can	 be	 an	 impulse	 and	 driver	 for	 the	
economy,”	 according	 to	 a	 manager	 at	 United	 Oilfield	 Services,	 a	 private	 Polish	 energy	 service	
company,	particularly	against	the	backdrop	of	Polish	gas	prices,	generally	perceived	as	being	among	
the	highest	in	Europe.	Because	of	the	potential	of	the	Polish	shale	reserves,	a	former	advisor	to	the	
Polish	 foreign	 minister	 alleged,	 “[s]ome	 of	 the	 [major	 international	 oil	 and	 gas	 companies]	 are	
viewing	Poland	as	a	base	for	their	European	oil	and	gas	business.”	Representatives	of	state‐owned	
companies	also	point	to	the	opportunities	coming	with	shale	gas—possibly	a	function	of	the	Polish	
government	 insisting	 on	 making	 them	 part	 of	 private‐industry‐led	 gas	 exploration.	 As	 the	 chief	
economist	 of	 the	 Polish	 national	 energy	 company	 Orlen	 insisted,	 “[i]t	 is	 not	 the	 case	 that	 the	
government	pushes	us	into	this.	.	.	.	We	go	in	because	we	believe	in	it	and	put	money	on	our	bet	that	
                                                            
2	Eni	Joins	Shale	Gas	Exodus	from	Poland,	Financial	Times,	January	15,	2014;	Exit	by	Two	Foreign	Firms	
Leaves	Polish	Shale	Gas	under	Cloud,	Reuters,	May	8,	2013.	
3	Dimiter	Kenarov,	Poland’s	Shale	Gas	Dream,	Foreign	Policy,	December	26,	2012.	
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we	 will	 find	 gas.”	 The	 benefits	 perceived	 by	 state‐owned	 companies	 include	 foreign	 direct	
investment,	gains	in	skills	and	expertise,	and	technology	transfer.		
	
The	second	dominant	interpretative	frame	surrounding	Polish	shale	centers	on	national	security.	This	
frame	 connects	 to	 Poland’s	 historical	 trauma	 of	 being	 geographically	 located	 between	 major	
European	powers.	As	coined	by	the	manager	at	United	Oilfield	Services,	“energy	is	a	foreign	policy	
tool	 for	 Russia	 [and]	 shale	 gas	 opens	 up	 the	 possibility	 of	 being	 more	 secure	 from	 Russia’s	
monopolistic	 position.”	 Other	 representatives	 of	 the	 Polish	 business	 community	 seconded	 this	
statement.	 Public	 officials	 remarked	 that	 “shale	 gas	 [is]	 part	 of	 [Poland’s]	 diversification	 policy”	
(representative	 of	 the	 Office	 of	 the	 Minister	 of	 the	 Treasury).	 Interviews	 with	 members	 of	 the	
scientific	 community	 also	 revealed	 the	 perception	 that	 shale	 gas	 “would	 be	 a	 milestone	 to	 be	
independent	from	Russia”	(professor	at	the	Polish	Institute	of	Soil	Science).		
	
Though	not	supporting	shale	gas	as	a	key	means	to	end	Gazprom’s	dominance	of	the	Polish	market,	
the	chairman	of	Poland’s	Green	Party	admits	that	“[c]itizens	see	the	opportunity	to	be	independent	
.	.	.	 from	Russia.”	Even	 for	Polish	environmental	NGOs,	 “sovereignty	 is	 important,”	as	alleged	by	a	
representative	of	Cleantech	Poland,	 a	 consultancy	 firm.	That	 said,	 environmental	NGOs	 remained	
among	 the	 more	 cautious	 observers,	 hinting	 that	 the	 business	 community	 may	 only	 utilize	 the	
security	 narrative	 for	 fostering	 the	 shale	 gas	 cause.	 As	 a	 representative	 of	 the	 Climate	 Coalition	
argued,	“[w]e	should	not	expect	too	much	in	the	way	of	shale	gas	development	in	Poland.	As	a	threat	
or	a	success	story.”	Still,	the	national	security	frame	is	embraced	by	the	bulk	of	actor	sets	represented	
in	the	interview	sample.	
	
The	third	dominant	frame	pertaining	to	Polish	shale	gas	relates	to	the	environment.	This	frame	is	
more	 contested.	To	 some,	 fracking	 technology	 represents	 an	environmental	bane	 in	Poland,	 as	 in	
other	 European	 countries.	 The	 prospects	 of	 drillings	 using	 horizontal	 hydraulic	 fracturing	 have	
indeed	 raised	 protests	 among	 the	 local	 population.	 A	 prominent	 case	 in	 point	 is	 the	 village	 of	
Zurawlow,	 whose	 inhabitants	 have	 successfully	 mobilized	 against	 drilling	 activities	 planned	 by	
Chevron.4	Skepticism	has	grown	mainly	regarding	groundwater	safety	issues	and	the	risks	posed	to	
local	 habitat.	 Environmental	 NGOs	 have	 vocally	 made	 the	 negative	 side	 effects	 of	 shale	 gas	
exploration	and	production	a	topic	in	public	debates,	which	led	to	attempts	by	the	Polish	government	
to	legally	curb	the	ability	of	NGOs	to	get	involved	in	shale	gas	matters.5		
	
However,	despite	the	presence	of	this	negative	frame,	the	dominant	narrative	is	one	of	environmental	
boon.	 This	 frame	 is	 supported	 by	 members	 of	 the	 business	 community,	 parts	 of	 the	 state	
administration,	 and,	 surprisingly,	 even	 the	 environmental	 community.	 As	 representatives	 of	 the	
employers’	 association,	 oil	 and	 gas	 companies	 and	 the	 business	 community	 stressed	 during	 the	
interviews	that	Poland	may	face	economic	pressure	related	to	the	European	carbon‐trading	scheme	
and	rising	carbon	prices—a	function	of	the	country’s	power	supply	relying	primarily	on	coal.	Shale	
was	 therefore	 generally	 supported	 as	 a	 means	 to	 decarbonize	 Poland’s	 energy	 system.	 More	
interestingly,	however,	the	environmental	community	also	cautiously	embraced	unconventional	gas	
as	an	opportunity	to	reduce	the	country’s	emissions.	As	a	representative	of	the	Climate	Coalition,	a	
Polish	environmental	NGO,	summarized:	“[w]e	believe	local	use	of	shale	gas	[using	the]	best	available	
technologies	could	be	a	transition	fuel	that	could	complement	the	use	of	renewables.”	Even	the	Green	
                                                            
4	Poland's	Shale	Gas	Revolution	Evaporates	in	Face	of	Environmental	Protests,	The	Guardian,	January	12,	
2015.	
5	Poland	Proposes	Restrictions	to	Shale	Gas	Opposition,	Natural	Gas	Europe,	April	1,	2013.	Available	at	
http://bit.ly/2ccODPH,	accessed	September	8,	2016.	
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Party	does	not	wholly	stand	against	shale	gas.	As	its	chairman	indicated,	his	party	was	divided	in	two	
groups,	with	one	opposing	shale	but	the	other	trying	to	demonstrate	that	alternatives	may	neutralize	
the	need	 to	explore	 it	 in	 the	 first	place.	 In	sum,	 “[w]ithin	environmental	organizations,	 there	 is	 a	
pragmatic	understanding”	(consultancy	firm	Cleantech	Poland).	
	
Bulgaria:	“Economic	Sellout,”	“Authoritarianism,”	and	“Environmental	
Bane”		
	
Much	as	did	Poland’s	political	elite,	Bulgaria’s	 leadership	sought	to	frame	shale	gas	as	a	matter	of	
national	security	and	economic	opportunity.	The	national	security	argument	came	following	a	January	
2009	dispute	between	Ukraine	and	Russia,	during	which	a	week‐long	gas	cutoff	left	the	country	out	
in	the	cold.	This	experience	was	what	motivated	statements	by	a	former	member	of	parliament	and	
chairman	of	the	Energy	Independence	Movement	to	the	effect	that	“[s]hale	gas	is	not	only	an	industry,	
it’s	geopolitics.”	Moreover,	rising	energy	prices	have	repeatedly	led	to	protest	in	Bulgaria,	reputedly	
the	 EU’s	 poorest	 country,	 and	 even	 forced	 governments	 to	 leave	 office.6	 It	 has	 been	 alleged	 by	
Bulgarian	 authorities	 that	 domestic	 sources	 of	 gas	 would	 ameliorate	 the	 situation	 and	 reduce	
exposure	to	price	hikes	induced	by	the	prevalent	oil	indexation.7	Furthermore,	as	the	former	deputy	
minister	 of	 economy,	 energy	 and	 tourism	 highlighted	 in	 an	 interview,	 the	 country’s	 envisaged	
“reindustrialization	process	[requires]	cheap	gas,”	which	would	also	“enter	state	budgets	in	the	form	
of	concession	fees	and	royalties	[and]	fix	our	trade	balance.”	
	
This	 national	 security	 and	 economic	 opportunity	 narrative	 resonated	 among	 some	 of	 the	
interviewees.	However,	it	did	not	prove	strong	enough	to	be	supported	by	key	actors:	Bulgaria,	in	
contrast	 to	 Poland,	 enacted	 a	 ban	 on	 fracking	 in	 January	 2012,	 which	 effectively	 stalled	 further	
exploration	activities	for	unconventional	gas	in	the	country	(LaBelle	and	Goldthau	2014).	Chevron,	
the	only	foreign	company	active	in	shale	gas	in	Bulgaria,	has	left.	
	
Three	negative	interpretative	frames	were	identified	as	dominant	in	Bulgaria.	
	
The	first,	the	economic	sellout	frame,	labels	shale	gas	as	an	attempt	to	exploit	domestic	resources	for	
private	gains.	This	frame	was	most	dominant	among	left	and	“green”	parties	and	the	local‐level	public	
administration,	but	it	was	also	supported	by	a	broader	cross‐section	of	societal	actors,	ranging	from	
business	associations	to	academia.	
	
In	this	frame,	foreign	companies	are	portrayed	as	the	cause	of	unsustainable	economic	activity	rather	
than	as	engines	of	growth	and	sources	of	investment.	As	the	co‐chairman	of	the	Bulgarian	Green	Party	
stated,	“foreign	companies	.	.	.	do	not	create	jobs	for	the	local	population	[except	for]	guards,	cleaning	
ladies	and	drivers.”	A	leading	activist	of	the	Fracking	Free	Bulgaria	Initiative	further	stressed	that	
“investor	is	a	dirty	word	in	Bulgaria	because	for	them	it’s	easy	to	bribe	officials	and	sign	contracts	
with	virtually	no	obligations.”	
	
The	negative	attitude	toward	foreign	investors,	particularly	in	the	extractive	sector,	coincides	with	
the	 widespread	 perception	 that	 “when	 things	 start	 to	 collapse,	 companies	 just	 give	 up,	 but	
environmental	 problems	 remain”	 (Member	of	 За	 Земята—Friends	of	 the	Earth	Bulgaria).	As	 the	
chairman	 of	 the	 Parliamentary	 Committee	 on	 Economic	 Policy,	 Energy	 and	 Tourism	 explained,	
“people	.	.	.	have	seen	in	the	past	how	[investors]	caused	damages	and	disappeared	after	that.”	What	
                                                            
6	Bulgaria’s	Electricity	Prices:	Protesting	about	Power	Prices,	The	Economist,	15	February,	2013.	
7	Chevron	Seeks	to	Explore	for	Shale	Gas	in	Bulgaria,	Reuters,	July	15,	2010.	
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is	more,	municipalities	do	not	perceive	economic	benefits	as	arising	from	drilling	activities.	On	the	
contrary,	the	mayor	of	the	town	of	Toshevo	stated,	“[w]e	don’t	have	any	gains	for	these	10	years	[the	
lifetime	 of	 the	 lease],	 only	 a	 symbolic	 rent	 for	 the	municipal	 lands.”	 Concession	 fees	 for	 natural	
resources	are	considered	low	by	international	standards,	which	has	caused	particular	controversy	in	
the	case	of	the	Bulgarian	gold	mining	sector.8	While	observers,	notably	from	academia,	stressed	the	
opportunities	 that	 would	 be	 missed,	 the	 general	 perception,	 which	 also	 resonated	 among	 the	
scientific	 community,	 was	 that	 “[t]here	 are	 no	 gains	 for	 the	 local	 population,	 only	 damages	 and	
problems”	(retired	hydrology	professor	and	anti‐shale‐gas	scientist).		
	
Importantly,	the	risk	that	fracking‐related	pollution	may	deprive	parts	of	Bulgarian	society	of	their	
economic	base	also	forms	part	of	the	“sellout”	frame.	For	instance,	the	region	of	Dobrudzha,	typically	
referred	to	as	the	“bread	basket	of	Bulgaria,”	had	been	earmarked	for	exploratory	fracking	drilling.	
Overall,	Bulgaria’s	agricultural	sector	adds	some	10	percent	to	GDP	and	accounts	for	19	percent	of	
the	total	employment	(European	Commission	2015),	as	compared	to	roughly	3	percent	for	the	EU	as	
a	whole.		
	
A	final	element	of	the	“economic	sellout”	frame	consists	in	the	prevailing	distrust	in	the	government.	
The	chairman	of	the	Parliamentary	Committee	on	Economic	Policy,	Energy	and	Tourism	hinted	that	
“it	 looked	 like	the	government	had	an	agreement	with	Chevron	without	 [a	proper]	assessment	of	
risks.”	 According	 to	 the	 chairman	 of	 the	 Bulgarian	 Federation	 of	 Industrial	 Energy	 Consumers	
(BFIEC),	the	prevalent	idea	was	that	“the	money	will	not	go	to	people,	but	to	the	state.”	This	brings	
the	shale	gas	industry	close	to	allegations	of	state	capture,	which	needs	to	be	seen	in	the	context	of	
high‐level	corruption	plaguing	the	country’s	energy	sector	(CSD	2014).	
	
The	second	frame	made	shale	gas	a	case	for	promoting	energy	authoritarianism.	Overall,	the	actors	
sharing	this	frame	were	similar	to	those	supporting	the	“economic	sellout”	frame,	but	this	frame	also	
found	supporters	among	the	proponents	of	shale	gas.	The	frame	highlights	the	problematic	way	that	
public	interests	were	handled	by	the	government	and	the	energy	industry—notably	by	Chevron,	as	
the	primary	company	active	in	unconventional	gas.	As	numerous	observers	noted,	information	levels	
on	 shale	 gas	 among	 the	 public	were	 generally	 low,	 and	 the	 former	 deputy	minister	 of	 economy,	
energy	and	tourism	confirmed	that	“[t]he	public	lacked	sufficient	information	and	the	government	
.	.	.	and	business	did	not	fill	this	gap	in	time.”		
	
Interviews	also	revealed	the	perception	that	information	on	the	fracking	technology	was	strategically	
withheld,	with	an	element	of	“secrecy”	(member	of	Bulgarian	Greens)	characterizing	governmental	
activities	 related	 to	planned	drilling	 activities.	 Information	 campaigns	were	pursued	 “in	 a	purely	
lobbyist	fashion”	(ibid.),	and	“[t]hings	were	presented	as	if	everything	is	going	to	be	alright”	(member	
of	За	Земята—Friends	of	the	Earth	Bulgaria).	As	a	result,	people	started	to	source	information	from	
the	 Internet,	with	Gasland,	 the	American	documentary	 on	 shale	 gas,	 being	 cited	 as	 a	 key	 source.	
Moreover,	 dialogue	 between	 the	 government	 and	 citizens	 and	 other	 key	 constituencies	 was	
described	as	poor	or	lacking.	As	observers	noted,	the	communication	between	the	private	sector	and	
civil	society	was	top‐down	and	channeled	through	the	state	administration.	Even	the	proponents	of	
shale	gas	admitted	that	“Chevron	.	.	.	did	not	provide	at	that	time	any	publicly	available	technological	
or	other	arguments	regarding	shale	gas	exploration”	(former	advisor	to	the	Bulgarian	minister	of	
economy	and	energy	and	former	Bulgarian	ambassador‐at‐large	for	energy	and	climate	change).		
	
                                                            
8	Dimiter	Kenarov,	Where	Your	Gold	Comes	From:	The	Story	of	an	Exploited	Town	in	Bulgaria,	The	Atlantic,	
November	7,	2011.	
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In	fact,	municipalities	and	the	local	population	typically	learned	about	planned	drilling	activities	only	
via	official	announcements.	As	one	local	mayor	revealed,	“[w]e	don’t	have	any	communication	with	
competent	authorities,	we	only	got	a	letter	from	the	ministry	when	[Chevron]	was	granted	a	permit	
for	exploration.”	This	top‐down	and	nonparticipatory	approach	on	the	part	of	the	government	was	
perceived	as	“endangering	democracy	and	the	environment”	(leader	of	the	anti‐shale‐gas	movement	
and	co‐chairman	of	the	Bulgarian	Greens).		
	
The	third	frame	pertains,	as	in	Poland,	to	shale	gas	being	an	environmental	bane.	As	was	pointedly	
noted	 by	 two	 senior	 scientists	 of	 the	 Bulgarian	 Academy	 of	 Sciences’	 Geological	 Institute,	 “the	
population	was	 frightened	 and	waited	 for	 some	 kind	 of	 apocalypses	 provoked	 by	 shale	 gas	 and	
fracking,”	which	was	 induced	by	 “information	 that	 came	 from	environmentalists’	organizations—
contamination	of	waters	and	soil	with	chemicals,	radiation,	earthquakes,	and	destruction.”	Overall,	
well‐educated	(co‐chairman	of	the	Bulgarian	Greens)	and	“predominantly	young	people	who	take	the	
Bulgarian	environment	and	nature	to	heart”	(former	advisor	to	the	Bulgarian	minister	of	economy	
and	energy)	drove	the	process.	Interviews	also	revealed	clear	rifts	within	the	scientific	community,	
with	 some	researchers	 siding	with	environmentalists	and	some	not.	 Scientists	 critical	of	 fracking	
were	 even	 alleged	 to	 form	 part	 of	 “epistemic	 communities	 .	.	.	 naturally	 leaning	 in	 favor	 of	
conventional	 technologies,”	 rather	 than	novel	 and	unconventional	 ones	 (member	 of	 the	board	of	
directors	and	head	of	the	exploration	unit	of	Oil	and	Gas	Exploration	and	Production	Plc).	
	
The	environmental	bane	frame	gained	particular	traction	in	the	context	of	potential	damage	done	to	
groundwater	safety,	and	specifically	to	an	aquifer	in	the	Dobrudzha	region.	While	officially	dismissed	
as	 “senseless	 theories”	 (former	 deputy	 minister	 of	 economy,	 energy	 and	 tourism),	 protesters	
managed	to	establish	a	link	to	agriculture	and	food	safety.	The	environmental	groups	constituting	the	
core	proponents	of	this	frame	were	also	joined	by	the	National	Association	of	Grain	Producers	and	
by	farmers	(Dobrich	protest	leader).	The	media,	finally,	tended	to	highlight	environmental	risks,	too,	
which	prompted	comments	from	the	energy	business	community	to	the	effect	that	“[t]he	media	was	
not	objective	in	covering	the	debate”	(representative	of	Oil	and	Gas	Exploration	and	Production	Plc).	
	
In	this	context,	 it	 is	 important	to	mention	the	alleged	Russia‐led	anti‐fracking	campaign,	aimed	at	
preventing	competition	in	the	form	of	domestic	energy	sources.9	As	our	data	suggest,	environmental	
protests	were	locally	rooted,	not	part	of	a	concerted	effort.	Moreover,	interviewees	at	the	municipal	
level	revealed	a	strong	suspicion	against	any	outside	intervention,	be	it	on	the	part	of	the	national	
government,	foreign	companies,	or	arguably	also	Moscow‐sponsored	agents.	
	
Overall,	a	broad	coalition	of	left‐leaning	political	parties	(notably	the	Greens	and	the	Socialist	Party),	
local	 municipalities,	 and	 scientists,	 but	 also	 industry	 associations	 and	 conservative	 parts	 of	 the	
society	such	as	farmers,	supported	this	third	frame	pertaining	to	the	Bulgarian	shale	gas	debate.	
	
Romania:	“Economic	Opportunity,”	“Environmental	Bane,”	and	Frame	
Segregation	
	
Because	Romania	covers	most	of	its	gas	consumption	through	domestic	production,	shale	gas	does	
not	play	as	vital	a	role	in	energy	security.	Romania	thus	offers	an	excellent	opportunity	to	test	the	
perceptions	and	frames	of	shale	gas	in	a	country	that	has	more	latitude	in	choosing	to	adopt	it.	
                                                            
9	Bulgarians	See	Russian	Hand	in	Anti‐Shale	Protests,	Financial	Times,	November	30,	2014;	Nato	Claims	
Moscow	Funding	Anti‐Fracking	Groups,	Financial	Times,	June	19,	2014.	
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In	many	respects,	the	Romanian	frames	feature	elements	of	those	in	both	Poland	and	Bulgaria.	On	
the	one	hand,	the	country’s	shale	gas	prospects	have	attracted	the	interest	of	international	energy	
corporations	such	as	Chevron	(US),	Sterling	Resources	(Canada),	TransAtlantic	Petroleum	(Canada),	
or	Hungary’s	MOL,	which	all	acquired	exploration‐and‐production	licenses.	Domestic	state‐owned	
gas	 producer	 Romgaz	 has	 also	 expressed	 interest	 in	 joining	 shale	 gas	 exploration.	 A	 temporary	
moratorium	on	shale	gas	exploration	in	2012	never	went	into	effect,	leaving	the	country	open	to	the	
fracking	technology.	On	the	other	hand,	growing	social	opposition	against	fracking	may	have	been	a	
decisive	factor	in	making	foreign	companies	let	go	of	Romanian	shale	gas	assets.10	Officially	citing	
disappointing	 test	 drillings	 and	 a	 bearish	 international	 business	 environment,	 Chevron	 has	
announced	it	will	leave	Romania,	whereas	Sterling	Resources	sold	their	assets	to	Carlyle,	the	investor	
group.	
	
As	our	interviews	show,	all	of	the	frames	identified	for	Poland	and	Bulgaria	also	exist	in	Romania,	
albeit	with	three	important	qualifiers:	the	environmental	boon	frame	does	not	feature	prominently;	
none	of	the	frames	is	dominant	among	all	actor	groups;	and	the	frames	seem	much	more	attached	to	
specific	actor	sets,	with	little	overlap	between	them.	
	
The	 economic	 opportunity	 frame,	 which	was	 strongly	 pushed	 by	 the	 Socialist	 Ponta	 government	
despite	its	rallying	against	shale	gas	while	in	opposition,	mainly	resonated	among	representatives	of	
the	state	administration	and	independent	observers.	Cases	in	point	are	statements	to	the	effect	that	
there	is	“a	favorable	case	[to	make]	for	shale	gas	exploration,	due	to	the	benefits	it	can	bring	to	the	
national	 economy	 and	 energy	 security”	 (Romanian	 ambassador‐at‐large	 for	 energy	 security	 and	
counselor	 to	 the	 prime	 minister).	 Shale	 gas	 would	 also	 improve	 the	 oligopolistic	 Romanian	 gas	
market	structure,	as	“[n]ew	competitors	.	.	.	would	bring	shale	gas	to	the	market	[which]	would	make	
competition	look	totally	different”	(energy	analysts	at	Expert	Forum,	a	Bucharest‐based	think	tank).	
Moreover,	the	counties	with	potential	for	shale	gas	extraction	typically	are	in	the	poorer	parts	of	the	
country,	and	“badly	.	.	.	need	better	infrastructure—water,	roads,	scholarships	for	kids,	etc.	(director	
of	the	National	Agency	for	Environmental	Protection	(ANPM),	Ministry	of	Environment,	Waters	and	
Forests).	Shale	gas	development	therefore	promises	to	enhance	“the	quality	of	life	in	the	involved	
local	 communities,	 by	 creating	 jobs	 and	 raising	 local	 budget	 revenues”	 (ambassador‐at‐large	 for	
energy	security).	
	
The	actors	embracing	the	economic	opportunity	narrative	partially	overlap	with	those	framing	shale	
in	terms	of	national	security.	Particularly,	representatives	of	state	institutions	and	the	ruling	party	
backed	this	frame.	The	general	argument	was	that	in	light	of	falling	domestic	production,	“shale	gas	
.	.	.	 is	a	potential	substitute	and	alternative	to	conventional	hydrocarbons	(member	of	parliament,	
Industry	 and	 Services	 Commission).	 Shale	 gas	 “would	 be	 a	 contribution	 to	 our	 energy	 balance”	
(director	 of	 ANPM)	 and	 may	 “strengthen	 Romania’s	 energy	 security	 .	.	.	,	 which	 is	 particularly	
important	in	the	current	regional	geopolitical	context”	(ambassador‐at‐large	for	energy	security).	In	
short,	 given	 “Romania’s	 energy	 security,	 we	 simply	 cannot	 ignore	 the	 potential	 contribution	 of	
natural	gas	from	shale	deposits”	(president	of	the	Romanian	Agency	for	Mineral	Resources,	ANRM).	
	
The	two	first	frames	starkly	contrast	with	the	narratives	of	economic	sellout	and	environmental	bane,	
which	are	shared	by	two	other	actor	sets—environmental	organizations	and	think	tanks.	According	
to	the	president	of	the	Terra	Mileniul	III	Foundation,	an	environmental	NGO,	shale	gas	exploration	
                                                            
10	Anca	Elena	Mihalache,	No	Shale	Gas,	After	All—Implications	of	Chevron’s	Exit	from	Romania,	Natural	Gas	
Europe,	March	30,	2015.	Available	at	http://bit.ly/1G1uEA1,	accessed	September	8,	2016.	
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and	production	“will	[only]	relocate	oil	workers	from	other	parts	of	the	country	to	the	production	
site,	while	the	more	specialized	employees	will	likely	come	from	abroad	[and]	there	are	not	many	
permanent	 positions	 in	 this	 industry.”	 Seconding	 this,	 and	 echoing	 arguments	 also	 made	 in	 the	
Bulgarian	context,	 analysts	at	Expert	Forum	stressed	 that	 “since	 the	kind	of	 job	openings	 for	 the	
industry	are	mainly	for	the	high‐skilled	workers	[there	are	no]	opportunities	for	the	locals—other	
than	a	few	low‐skills	jobs.”	In	addition,	the	royalty	system	was	criticized	as	generating	insignificant	
financial	revenue.		
	
The	perception	of	losing	out	economically	coincides	with	fears	of	potential	harm	done	to	agricultural	
land	and	habitat.	Though	some	observers	argued	that	“[b]ringing	more	gas	to	the	energy	mix[,	thus]	
replacing	coal	.	.	.	would	bring	down	emissions	in	Romania”	(analyst	at	Expert	Forum)	and	stressed	
Romania’s	longstanding	history	and	sophisticated	expertise	in	the	oil	and	gas	industry	and	its	ability	
to	 implement	 proper	 environmental	 oversight	 (member	 of	 parliament,	 Industry	 and	 Services	
Commission),		environmental	risks	dominate.	What	is	more,	while	the	environmental	risk	narrative	
was	most	dominant	in	the	national‐level	discourse,	the	economic	sellout	frame	resonated	strongest	
at	the	local	level.	As	a	consequence,	“these	two	kinds	of	protest	are	augmenting	each	other”	(analyst	
at	Expert	Forum).		
	
The	 latter	 two	 frames	 extend	 into	 the	 authoritarianism	 frame.	 It	 is	mainly	 embraced	 by	 protest	
groups,	NGOs,	and	think	tanks.	This	narrative	on	the	one	hand	centers	on	institutional	capacity	and	
quality.	In	the	words	of	an	analyst	at	Expert	Forum,	“the	fickle	institutions	probably	[are]	one	of	the	
most	important	obstacles	against	public	acceptance	of	fracking.	The	public	does	not	trust	institutions	
that	today	want	to	put	a	moratorium	on	fracking	and	tomorrow	turn	into	enthusiastic	supporters	of	
it.”	Moreover,	as	various	experts	repeated,	accessible	scientific	information	in	the	Romanian	language	
was	scarce,	and	the	quality	of	information	remained	low.	As	a	counselor	to	the	minister	for	energy	
and	member	of	the	management	council	of	Transgaz	mourned,	“[d]iscussions	in	the	media	are	mainly	
emotional,	with	 little	reference	to	science‐based	assessments	of	 the	costs	and	risks	that	shale	gas	
operation	can	bring	to	Romania.”	Gasland,	the	US	documentary,	was	again	cited	as	a	key	source	of	
information,	which	some	observers	deemed	“scientifically	unfounded”	(president	of	ANRM)	or	even	
“hostile	[and]	fuelled	by	often	radical	and	anarchistic	movements”	(ambassador‐at‐large	for	energy	
security).	
	
This	antagonism	connects	in	part	to	Romania’s	experience	with	an	open‐pit	gold‐mining	project	at	
Roșia	 Montană	 in	 Alba	 county	 (Transylvania),	 a	 contested	 project	 for	 its	 use	 of	 the	 poisonous	
cyanidation	mining	technique	and	allegations	of	corruption	surrounding	the	permitting	process.11	In	
this	context,	scientific	studies	have	allegedly	been	commissioned	by	vested	interests.	As	a	result,	a	
deep	divide	can	be	identified	between	two	“epistemic	communities”	(director	of	the	Energy	Policy	
Group,	a	Bucharest‐based	think	tank):	scientists	and	the	business	community,	on	the	one	hand,	and	
the	 shale	 gas	 critics,	 on	 the	 other.	 As	 the	 president	 of	 Terra	Mileniul	 III	 alleged,	 “scientists	 and	
academics	that	often	promote	shale	gas	.	.	.	are	happy	to	get	a	small	research	contract	financed	by	the	
oil	companies.”	Coupled	with	“weak	and	indecisive	 .	.	.	authorities	 .	.	.	 there	are	only	the	NGOs	and	
civil	society	left	to	counterbalance	this.”	
	
In	this	respect,	shale	gas	was	also	perceived	as	an	issue	of	citizen	participation.	As	the	director	of	
ANPM	admits,	“[u]nfortunately,	we	started	off	on	the	wrong	foot,	due	to	inadequate	communication.”	
A	member	of	the	management	council	of	Transgaz,	Romania’s	state‐owned	operator	of	the	national	
gas	 transmission	 system,	 went	 further	 by	 stressing	 that	 “[t]he	 fact	 that	 currently	 there	 is	 no	
                                                            
11	Romania	Expected	to	Reject	Gold	Mine	Following	Week	of	Protest,	The	Guardian,	September	10,	2013.	
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participation	of	local	communities	in	the	prospective	revenues	makes	them	justifiably	frustrated.”	
Analysts	 at	 Expert	 Forum	pointed	 to	 the	heavy	 security	 apparatus	deployed	 to	protect	 shale	 gas	
exploration	 that	 raised	 “serious	 concerns	about	human	rights	 infringement.”	 In	all,	while	 the	key	
actors	embracing	the	authoritarian	narrative	are	found	among	NGOs,	civil	society,	and	think	tanks,	
this	frame	also	resonates	among	certain	representatives	of	state	institutions.	
	
Conclusion	
	
The	research	conducted	here	regarding	 three	Eastern	European	countries—Poland,	Bulgaria,	and	
Romania—suggests	that	the	same	technology	can	be	given	diverging	meanings.	This	has	at	least	four	
implications	for	political	scientists,	security	analysts,	and	international	relations	scholars.			
	
First,	as	Table	A1	summarizes,	shale	gas	fracking	can	be	perceived,	positively,	as	a	way	of	accelerating	
economic	development,	serving	national	interests,	and	increasing	regional	security,	and	encouraging	
less	carbon‐intensive	forms	of	energy	supply.	However,	other	relevant	social	groups	envisioned	shale	
gas	 as	 an	 environmental	 bane	 due	 to	 its	 impacts	 on	 water	 and	 ecosystems,	 as	 a	 mechanism	 of	
transferring	 national	 wealth	 and	 assets	 out	 of	 the	 country,	 and	 as	 reinforcing	 patterns	 of	
authoritative	decision‐making	or	further	marginalizing	the	poor	and	vulnerable.	Thus,	it	is	a	mistake	
to	view	energy	systems	as	apolitical	or	uniformly	interpreted.				
	
Second,	the	fact	that	five	of	our	frames—all	but	“environmental	boon”—occur	within	relevant	social	
groups	 across	 two	 or	 more	 countries	 implies	 a	 commonality	 of	 interpretation.	 That	 is,	 despite	
differing	 cultures,	 time	 periods,	 energy	 markets,	 modes	 of	 industrial	 cooperation,	 and	 national	
identities,	there	seem	to	be	more	universal	frames	that	resonate	with	social	groups	at	a	deeper	level.	
Energy	systems	such	as	shale	gas	can	therefore	intersect	positively	with	notions	of	economic	growth	
and	national	security,	or	negatively	with	issues	of	social	injustice	and	concerns	over	environmental	
degradation.	Interpretive	frames	can	become	aligned	across	cultures	and	contexts.				
	
Third,	 cross‐country	 exchange	 clearly	 exists	 among	 the	 groups	 subscribing	 to	 a	 given	 frame.	
Moreover,	media	or	films	such	as	Gasland	foster	the	transnational	dissemination	or	solidification	of	
certain	frames.	At	the	same	time,	different	sets	of	institutions	tend	to	gather	behind	or	share	frames.	
For	this	reason,	 it	 is	not	necessarily	one	 frame	per	 institution,	but	different	 frames	are	shared	by	
various	sets	of	institutions.	Sometimes	one	institution	also	buys	into	several	frames	at	the	same	time	
(e.g.,	jobs	and	national	security).	The	fact	that	many	types	of	actors	(such	as	business	associations	or	
public	administrators)	can	populate	multiple	frames	at	once	may	imply	that	they	have	learned	about	
this	universal	appeal	of	some	frames,	and	may	switch	between	them	depending	on	their	audience.	
Moreover,	this	suggests	that,	although	frames	can	“travel”	across	borders,	such	“cross‐border	frame	
export”	from	one	country	to	another	is	not	necessarily	a	linear	process.	
	
Finally,	our	study	reveals	that	energy	systems	such	as	shale	gas	possess	an	interpretive	flexibility,	
but	so	 far	 lack	closure	and	stabilization,	given	that	various	social	stakeholders	continue	to	attach	
different,	and	at	times	conflicting,	meanings	to	them.	Shale	gas,	in	other	words,	is	polysemiotic—it	
will	provoke	a	heterogeneous	mix	of	 varying	 reactions,	based	on	both	 the	 type	of	 relevant	 social	
group	 and	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 particular	 frame.	 The	 interpretive	 flexibility	 of	 shale	 gas	 therefore	
reminds	 us	 that	 energy	 projects	 not	 only	 mark	 the	 physical	 landscape	 and	 contribute	 to	 the	
production	and	distribution	of	natural	gas	or	other	energy	sources.	They	can	also	transfer	what	were	
once	 customary	 public	 resources	 into	 private	 hands,	 concentrate	 political	 power,	 become	
intertwined	in	national	discourses	of	revitalization	and	strength,	and	validate	distinct	approaches	to	
economic	and	social	development.		
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These	 findings	 bear	 important	 implications	 for	 other	 fields	 of	 social	 inquiry,	 including	 security	
studies—a	 field	 mostly	 concerned	 with	 the	 geopolitical	 implications	 of	 shale	 gas.	 As	 this	 study	
reveals,	new	energy	technologies	such	as	shale	gas	interact	in	mutually	reinforcing	ways	with	social,	
cultural,	political,	and	economic	 forces.	Therefore,	 the	 interpretative	meaning	attached	 to	a	novel	
technology	determines	whether	or	not	it	will	blend	into	a	given	energy	system	in	a	seamless	way,	and	
whether	it	will	“succeed”	or	“fail.”		
	
In	other	words,	the	deployment	of	new,	yet	risky	energy	technologies	such	as	shale	gas	fracking	is	
not	simply	a	function	of	resource	endowments	and	technological	progress.	Instead,	it	the	result	of	
dynamic	stakeholder	interactions	and	of	the	related	discursive	processes	that	result.	These	dynamics,	
not	hardnosed	security	imperatives	by	themselves,	will	eventually	determine	whether	or	not	shale	
gas	will	go	global.		Also,	and	more	troublingly,	assessments	of	shale	gas	that	ignore	these	(sometimes	
hidden)	 social	 dimensions	 threaten	 to	 naturalize	 them	 as	 part	 of	 the	 normal	 environment	 and	
depoliticize	them	as	acceptable	risks.	
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Appendix	
	
Table	A1	
Summary	of	Shale	Gas	Interpretive	Frames,	Locations,	and	Relevant	Social	Groups	in	Eastern	
Europe 
	 Interpretive	
Frame	
Present	in Relevant	Social	
Group(s)	
Description	
Positive		 Economic	
opportunity	
Poland,	Bulgaria Government	
ministries,	private	
energy	companies	
Shale	gas	will	
endow	countries	
and	communities	
with	jobs,	economic	
development,	tax	
revenue	and	in	
some	situations	a	
reindustrialization	
of	the	economy	
	
	 National	
security	
Poland,	Bulgaria Energy	consumers,	
some	government	
ministries,	private	
energy	companies,	
members	of	civil	
society		
Shale	gas	will	
enable	countries	to	
liberate	themselves	
from	dependence	
on	energy	imports	
(particularly	from	
Russia)	and	
enhance	regional	
stability	
	 Environmental	
boon	
Poland	 Trade	groups,	
unions,	private	
companies,	some	
environmentalists,	
some	politicians		
	
Shale	gas	will	assist	
Poland	in	its	
process	of	national	
decarbonization		
Negative		 Environmental	
bane	
Poland,	Bulgaria Local	communities,	
environmental	
nongovernmental	
organizations	
Shale	gas	threats	
water	quality	and	
availability,	risks	
chemical	pollution,	
and	can	accelerate	
species	loss	and	the	
destruction	of	
habitats	
	 Economic	
sellout	
Bulgaria Political	parties,	
some	civil	society	
groups,	some	trade	
Shale	gas	
production	merely	
transfers	wealth	
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unions	and	business	
associations,	local	
public	
administrators,	
some	academics	
and	revenue	out	of	
domestic	economies	
to	foreign	actors	
	 Energy	
authoritarianism	
Bulgaria Trade	and	business	
associations,	local	
public	
administrators,	
some	civil	society	
groups	
Shale	gas	decision‐
making	is	opaque,	
can	concentrate	
political	power,	and	
marginalize	local	
communities		
	
	
Table	A2	
Summary	of	Interviewees	
Position	 Organization
Poland	 	
President	 Polish	Ecological	Club	(Central‐Eastern	Region)	
Economist,	strategy	and	PPM	
department	
PKN	Orlen
Expert,	Department	of	Energy	
and	Climate	Change	
Polish	Confederation	of	Private	Employers	Lewiatan	(PKPP	
Lewiatan)		
President	of	the	board Environmental	Protection	League,	Lublin		
Advisor	to	minister	and	to	chief	
national	geologist	
Ministry	of	the	Environment
Country	manager,	business	
development	
United	Oilfield	Services
Director‐level	expert,	
Department	of	Energy	and	
Climate	Change	
Polish	Confederation	of	Private	Employers	Lewiatan	(PKPP	
Lewiatan)		
Chairman	 Poland’s	Green 2004	Party
Chief	expert,	Department	of	
Economic	Policy	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
Deputy	director	 Regional	Directorate	for	Environmental	Protection	(RDOS)
Former	advisor	to	foreign	
minister	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
Executive	director	 Cleantech	Poland	
Advisor	&	geologist	 Instytut	Studiow	Energetycznych	/	Institute	of	Energy	
Studies	
Professor	 Polish	Institute	of	Soil	Science
Professor	 Polish	Institute	of	Soil	Science
Professor	 John	Paul	II	Catholic	University	of Lublin	(KUL)	
Expert,	economic	policy	
department	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
Energy	and	natural	resources	
lawyer	
White & Case	Warsaw
Corporate	affairs	manager	 Talisman	Energy
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General	manager	 Talisman	Energy	Polska	Sp.
Researcher,	economics	
department	
Warsaw	University	
Project	coordinator	 Climate	Coalition
Researcher	and	policy	analyst	 Instytut	na	rzecz	Ekorozwoju	/	Polish	Institute	for	
Sustainable	Development,	Projekt	LIFE+	„Dobry	Klimat	dla	
Powiatów”	
Expert,	Department	of	Strategic	
Projects,	Office	of	the	Minister		
Ministry	of	the	Treasury
Poland	representative	 NaftaGaz	Poland
Professor	in	power	engineering	 Technical	University	of	Lodz,	Poland
Institute	of	Electric	Power	Engineering	
Professor	 John	Paul	II	Catholic	University	of	Lublin	(KUL)	
Bulgaria	 	
Regional	leader	in	antifracking	
organization	
Dobrich—anti‐shale	movement
Antifracking	leader	/	co‐chair	 Anti‐shale‐gas	coalition	/	Green party
Professor	 Sofia	University,	Faculty	of	Economics	and	Business	
Administration	
Member	of	parliament Bulgarian	Parliament;	chairman	of	the	parliamentary	
Committee	on	Economic	Policy,	Energy	and	Tourism,	
member	of	Union	of	Democratic	Forces	party	
Member	of	parliament	/	former	
deputy	minister	
National	assembly	/	former	minister	of	economy,	energy	and	
tourism,	Citizens	for	European	Development	of	Bulgaria	
(GERB)	party	
Mayor	 General	Toshevo municipality,	member	of	Bulgarian	Socialist	
Party	(BSP)	
Mayor	 Dobrich	urban	municipality,	GERB
Former	member	of	parliament,	
Leader	
Energy	Independence	Movement
Director‐level	expert	 Regional	Inspectorate	for	Environment	and	Water	Varna
Director‐level	expert,	
Department	of	Energy	
Resources	and	Concessions	
Ministry	of	Economy	and	Energy	/	Bulgarian	Energy	and	
Mining	Forum	
Managing	partner	at	private	
energy	consultancy	/	former	
ambassador	of	Bulgaria	in	
Russia	
Innovative	Energy	Solutions	/	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
Campaigner	 Fracking	Free	Bulgaria	Initiative
Analysts,	Economic	Program	 Center	for	the	Study	of	Democracy
Analysts,	Economic	Program	 Center	for	the	Study	of	Democracy
Municipal	deputy	mayor	 Dobrich	rural	municipality
Chief	environmental	expert	 Dobrich	rural	municipality
Head	of	environmental	unit	 Dobrich	urban	municipality
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Member	of	the	board	of	
directors	and	head	of	the	
exploration	unit	
Oil	and	Exploration	and	Production	Plc.	
Former	advisor	to	minister	of	
economy	and	energy	&	former	
ambassador‐at‐large	for	energy	
and	climate	change	
Ministry	of	Economy	and	Energy
Deputy	director	 Geological	Institute,	Bulgarian	Academy	of	Sciences	
Professor	 Sofia	University,	Department	of	Geology	and	Geography
Professor	(retired),	hydrologist,	
anti‐shale‐gas	activist	
Bulgarian	Academy	of	Sciences
Professor	 Institute	of	Geology,	Bulgarian	Academy	of	Sciences	
Drilling	supervisor	 Genting	Oil	&	Gas
Director	of	strategic	planning	
and	investments	
Bulgarian	Federation	of	the	Industrial	Energy	Consumers	
(BFIEC)/	Stomana	Industry	
Head	of	unit	in	the	Water	
Management	Directorate	
State	Ministry	of	Energy	and	Water
Member	 За	Земята—Friends	of	the	Earth	Bulgaria	&	CEE	Bankwatch	
Network	
Member	 За	Земята—Friends	of	the	Earth	Bulgaria	
Member	 Green	Policy	Institute,	Green party
Former	member	of	parliament	/	
Chair	
Bulgarian	National	Assembly	/	Temporary	Committee	on	the	
Study	of	Shale	Gas,	GERB	
Romania	 	
Analyst,	energy	&	public	policy	 Expert	Forum
Analyst,	energy	&	public	policy	 Expert	Forum
President	 Romanian	Agency	for	Mineral	Resources		
Director	 Romanian	Agency	for	Mineral	Resources		
Counselor	to	energy	minister	 Ministry	of	Energy
Member	of	parliament	/	
commission	member	
Romanian	Parliament	/	Commission	on	Industry	and	
Services	
Ambassador‐at‐large	for	energy	
security	
Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs
President	 Terra	Mileniul	III
Director	 Energy	Policy	Group,	a	Bucharest‐based	think	tank	
	
	
